






Abstract This paper explores likely changes in the types
and extent of uncertainty resulting from increased regulation
of fisheries. Specifically, fisheries management may be a prin-
cipal source of uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty may
be substituted for the uncertainty of nature.
Introduction
Ocean fisheries must surely rank high among industries that in
the recent past have had to adjust to fundamental changes in
institutional framework. The changes in the law of the sea have
either made fleets obsolescent by banning them from their tradi-
tional fishing grounds or added to the costs of fleets that could
gain access to traditional waters now under the jurisdiction of
foreign countries. These changes are indeed an outstanding ex-
ample of the latent uncertainty inherent in all institutional ar-
rangements, no matter how time-honored they may be. But such
revolutionary events are—fortunately, we might say—rare.
While less dramatic but more persistent types of uncertainty are
more relevant for day-to-day fisheries management, I still find
the introduction of the 200-mile limit an appropriate point of
departure because of its highly significant impact. In the United
States an entirely new institutional structure has been erected in
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its wake, and elsewhere more authority has been bestowed upon
established institutions. In short, fisheries are being regulated as
never before.
The Conventional Wisdom
What are the implications, with respect to uncertainty, of a
tighter regulation of fisheries? Conventional wisdom tells us that
the welfare-economic impact of a strengthened management
would be beneficial. There are two main arguments leading to
this conclusion. First, there is the indicative planning argu-
ment—that is, the uncertainty that firms and individuals face is
to some extent the result of a lack of information about other
agents' plans, including those of the government, usually the
most infiuential agent of all. This uncertainty will be reduced if
the government announces the direction in which it will be steer-
ing the economy. Second, there is the argument that a govern-
ment planning agency need not be unduly deterred by
uncertainty—more precisely, the kind of uncertainty which is
usually called risk. For the economy as a whole, as well as in the
long run, variances in returns will cancel each other out, and the
government can thus concentrate on the expected return from a
particular industry.
The basic fault with this conventional wisdom is that it as-
sumes a well-informed and benevolent government which max-
imizes some unselfish welfare function. Once we take a more
realistic approach and view government and its branches as en-
tities furthering their own selfish interest, these conclusions
about uncertainty and fisheries management are no longer neces-
sarily correct. In particular, I wish to question these conclusions
by presenting the following considerations:
1. Fisheries management may itself be a source of uncer-
tainty. Therefore, by increasing the authority of fisheries
management, institutional uncertainty may be substituted
for the uncertainty of nature.
2. The elimination of risk or the mitigation of its conse-
quences may in certain cases increase allocative ineffi-
ciency in the fisheries.Fisheries Management and Uncertainty 91
Regulation by a Single Authority
Let us first ignore the international dimension and look at possi-
ble sources of uncertainty within a single fisheries-management
authority. If we are trying to build a theory on the hypothesis of
maximizing behavior, we first need to consider the following
question: What is the management authority trying to maximize?
Here it is probably useful to think of this authority not as a
monolith but as composed of two groups with different interests,
"politicians" and "bureaucrats." The politicians formulate policy
and are directly or indirectly responsible to the electorate. The
bureaucrats are professionals whose tenure is not in principle
subject to political vagaries.
As we know, politicians in a democracy have to seek legiti-
macy by convincing a sufficient number of voters of the
usefulness of their services—at least in relative terms. As we
know equally well, this is not accomplished by persuasive ar-
gumentation about the social welfare function. Catering to the
interests of well-defined groups appears to be a more direct route
to power and infiuence. Such an approach has an unfortunate
side effect. What so often are identified as group interests are
privileges or rents arising from allocative inefficiencies—for ex-
ample, monopoly profits and rents that result from limited entry
to professions. What appears to an individual as a minuscule
part in an improvement for the general public is willingly
sacrificed for a bigger share in some privilege at the expense of
the general public. The problem is, of course, that when a
sufficient number of interest groups have been bought off in this
way, all may end up in a worse position than otherwise would
have been the case.
What, then, is the implication for uncertainty of increased
government regulation? There are contending influences: in
some ways uncertainty will be reduced, while in other ways it
will be increased. Uncertainty will tend to increase, or be in-
troduced into an otherwise predictable environment, because it
is sufficient to buy the support of a limited but varying number of
interest groups to obtain the electoral support needed to wield
the powers of government. There are several reasons why the
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times. First, it will he necessary to renew old alliances time and
again with new favors or to replace the old alliances with new
ones. Second, the relative "cost" of different interest groups
may change over time. Third, different contending political par-
ties will have preferences for, or different cost considerations in,
enlisting the support of different interest groups. Fourth, as it
becomes increasingly clear how governments cater to group in-
terests, more and more effort will be spent on lobbying for such
interests or on forming new groups around any such common
interest as may be identified. Indeed, one may perhaps go as far
as to say that entrepreneurial talent is increasingly being re-
warded by gaining favors from the government rather than mak-
ing a salable product. As this sort of activity becomes more
widespread, the general framework within which firms operate
will become more fluid, and there will be increased uncertainty
as to who will be favored by government at any particular time.
One particular type of uncertainty, however, will doubtless be
decreased by the increased regulation of fisheries. This is the
uncertainty associated with technological change and obsoles-
cence. Because innovators are few, there is more electoral sup-
port to be enlisted from those who are threatened with
obsolescence. Governmental support of sunset industries in
Western Europe is a good example. In Norway governmental
policy gives explicit support to labor-intensive fisheries and rec-
ommends the phasing out of one of the few profitable fisheries
(the factory trawlers). Another example is the prohibition of
purse seine gear in the Lofoten (Norway) fishery a few years
after it was introduced in the 1950s. This is extremely efficient
fishing gear, but a biologically defensible use of this gear would
greatly reduce the need for boats and manpower. Arguments not
dissimilar to the ones advanced against purse seine gear were
also used against the introduction of motorized vessels about a
hundred years ago, but to little avail. (This was well before the
age of economic planning.)
So much for politicians, but what about bureaucrats? Will
their activities tend to increase or reduce uncertainty? Here
again there are conflicting tendencies. One reasonable hypothe-
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sticking to established regulations and routines. However, to the
extent that they repeatedly have to justify their existence (or if
they are empire builders), they would be expected to revise old
routines and create new regulations as evidence of their indis-
pensability. (There is perhaps some room for differences in per-
sonalities to affect the outcome.)
International Regulation
As the law, or lawlessness, of the sea so amply illustrates, the
basic entity in international relations is the nation-state. The
actions of national management authorities are perhaps in princi-
ple explicable as maximizing behavior, but where the interests of
different national agencies are involved, game theory would be
more adequate. Interdependence of national interests is still im-
portant in world fisheries despite the extended fishing limits: as
is well known, many fish stocks transgress national boundaries.
As a result of the 200-mile limit and the creation of exclusive
fishing rights, internationally shared stocks are now increasingly
being regulated by quotas. This is certainly the case in the north-
east Atlantic. For the fishermen concerned, the uncertainty pre-
viously attached to the abundance or scarcity of fish stocks has
now been replaced by uncertainty about the quota allotment for
the next season. Despite the fact that quotas are supposed to be
based on scientific advice, nature is not alone in creating uncer-
tainty about them. One source of uncertainty is the linkage of
issues in international relations: at certain times governments
may be tempted to trade their interests in fisheries for some
other benefit; at other times they may have too little clout to put
behind their claims to a share in the total allowable catch. There
is even uncertainty about whether the interested parties will
manage to reach agreement on quotas before it is too late in the
season. The negotiations within the European Economic Com-
munity on such matters are a notorious example. The EEC bu-
reaucrats have invented the ingenious trick of stopping the clock
to deal with deadlines, but this practice can be quite exasperat-
ing for those who are living in real time.
Additional uncertainty in internationally shared fisheries has94 Rognvaldur Hannesson
to do with the difficulties of monitoring the enforcement of inter-
nationally agreed regulations. These regulations are supple-
mented with agreements on mutual rights of inspection, but such
rights are usually much less effective than when nationals alone
are involved. Furthermore, sovereign states are seldom willing
to grant others the rights of inspecting their own fishermen. Most
often under international fisheries agreements each party is sup-
posed to monitor its own fishermen. The problem is that a single
party to an international agreement would benefit from breaking
it as long as the breach was not detected. This is unfortunate:
those who are supposed to police the agreement are precisely
those who would benefit from breaking it. Such a situation
creates various uncertainties for the fisheries. First, the long-
term benefits from any fisheries agreement may not materialize
as projected at its inception. Second, when one party to the
agreement has become convinced that another's adherence is
only lukewarm, the agreement will collapse and so will the
broader framework within which the fishermen have made their
decisions. For example, fishermen could suddenly be excluded
from fishing grounds to which they had been given access by the
agreement, or there might arise a situation of free access, in
which benefits would accrue to those who are first to reach
whatever fish are available.
Protection from Risk
In stating that a mitigation of the consequences of risk in
fisheries by government interference may actually increase
inefficiency in the economy, I have in mind the risk due to natu-
ral fluctuations in the abundance of fish causing variations in
yield per unit of effort. We are all familiar with the tendency
toward a wasteful allocation of resources resulting from free
access to common property. If a fishery is more risky than other
industries while fishermen are risk-averse, this will to some ex-
tent offset the misallocation arising from free access. Thus, with
a fisheries policy that protects fishermen from this risk by eve-
ning out the fluctuations in their income while doing nothing to
limit fishing effort, the result will be an increased waste of re-Fisheries Management and Uncertainty 95
sources to the extent that risk discourages effort. Owing to the
above-mentioned predilection of governments to cater to special
interests, this is perhaps to be expected. Belovi' I shall give an
example, but first I shall demonstrate the argument a bit more
technically.
Let us compare an industry in which the returns are risky (the
fishery) to a riskless alternative. We assume a risk-neutral social
planner, as variations in revenue in the fishery should be of little
concern at the macroeconomic level. On the other hand, we
assume risk-averse decision makers at the microeconomic level
in the fishery. The social planner's problem may be stated as
follows:
maximize ^(TT) = E[R(f)] - cf
where ir is profit (rent), R is gross revenue per year,/is fishing
effort, and E is the expectations operator. We assume that the
expectation of R is given by a long-run sustainable yield func-
tion, but that environmental fluctuations can lead to variations in
fish growth. We shall thus ignore transitions between long-term
equilibria. Fishing costs per unit of effort c are assumed to be
constant and known with certainty. The necessary condition for
maximum is
E(R') = c
Compare this to the bionomic equilibrium. The equilibrium con-
dition under free access when there is risk aversion on behalf of
decision makers is that rents be just sufficient to cover the risk
premium, which ensures indifference between the risky and the
riskless alternative—that is,
E(R/f) - c = F
where P is the necessary risk premium per unit of effort. Com-
paring this with the condition for a social optimum, we see that
this would be compatible with free access if
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that is, if the risk premium corresponded to the difference be-
tween the expected revenue per unit of effort and the expected
marginal revenue. This would, of course, be a coincidence, and
the risk premium would in all probability be much lower than
this difference. But more importantly, the existence of a positive
risk premium will reduce the difference between optimal effort
and equilibrium effort. Therefore, any reduction of individual
risk brought about by a government policy which does not simul-
taneously limit fishing effort will be counterproductive and actu-
ally increase the gap between optimal and equilibrium effort.
Fisheries policy in Norway seems to offer an example of a
rather extreme variation on this theme. Providing fishermen with
an income comparable to that of industrial workers is a strong
element in Norwegian fisheries policy. This policy has in prac-
tice usually meant supporting the fisheries with subsidies in lean
years and not taxing excess profits in good years. If it can be
assumed that effort expands when there are excess profits, the
result is that effort increases over time but is never reduced
because the losses which would lead to a contraction of effort
are not allowed to occur. In a vicious circle, effort continually
expands, and the "need" for subsidies increases along with it.